2, that these ideas _while in a state of conservation_ and without entering consciousness—i.e., becoming conscious memory—express themselves in written language. 3, that this occurs while the subject has complete amnesia for the conserved ideas and therefore he could not possibly reproduce them as conscious memory. 4, that that which effects the writing is not a recurring phase of the self-consciousness which is concerned at the moment with totally different ideas. 5, that the “state of conservation” is, at least during the writing, a specific state existing and functioning independently and outside of the personal self-consciousness. 6, that in functioning it induces specific processes which make use of the same organized physiological mechanisms which ordinarily are made use of by conscious memory to express itself in writing and that these processes are not in, but independent of, consciousness. We are forced to conclude therefore that a conscious experience—in this case the ideas of the verse—is conserved through the medium of some kind of residuum of itself capable of specific functioning and inducing processes which reproduce in the form of written symbols the ideas of the original experience. We need not consider for the present the nature of the residuum, and its process, whether it is the ideas themselves or something else. =Residual processes underlying hallucinations.=—We will take the observation of B. C. A. looking into a crystal and reading some printed words—a cablegram—which she had previously unconsciously overheard.[45] The words were, let us say, “Best Wishes and a Happy New Year.” This visual picture was not a literal reproduction of the original experience, which was a subconscious _auditory_ experience of the same words, of which she was not aware; but plainly, nevertheless, the visual picture must have been determined somehow by the auditory experience. Equally plainly the visual image was not a recurrent phase of the consciousness, for the words of the message had not been previously _seen_. What occurred was this: the antecedent auditory perception manifested itself in consciousness _after an interval of time_ as a visual hallucination of the words. There was a reproduction of the original experience but not in its original form. It had undergone a _secondary alteration_ by which the visual perception replaced the auditory perception. As a memory it was a conversion or _translation_ of an auditory experience into terms of another sense. Now the conversion must have been effected by some mechanism outside of consciousness; that is to say, it was not an ordinary visualization, i.e., intensely vivid secondary images pertaining to a _conscious_ memory, as when one thinks of the morning’s breakfast table and visualizes it; for there was no conscious memory of the words, or knowledge that there ever had been such an experience. The visualization therefore must have been induced