A charge of dependence upon Great Britain in affairs of diplomacy was as effective a weapon then as it has been since in matters financial. Clay's resolution passed the House by a vote of 80 to 75, but still the executive arm of the government did not move. In 1817 and 1818 the question of South American independence was continually before the cabinet for discussion. President Monroe seemed strongly inclined toward recognition, but in this he was opposed by Adams and Calhoun, who were unwilling to act in the matter without some understanding with England, and if possible with France. Our relations with Spain in regard to the Indian troubles in Florida were in a very strained condition and any action taken at that time in recognition of South America would have involved us in war with Spain and almost inevitably with other European powers. The President, therefore, as a matter of expediency postponed the action which his sympathy prompted, and, in his annual message of November 16, 1818, expressed his satisfaction at the course the government had hitherto pursued and his intention of adhering to it for the time being.[45] Under the President's direction, however, efforts were made to secure the cooperation of Great Britain and France in promoting the independence of South America.[46] In 1819 an amicable adjustment of our differences with Spain seemed to have been reached by the negotiation of a treaty providing for the cession of the Floridas to the United States and the settlement of long-standing claims of American citizens against Spain. An unforeseen difficulty arose, however, which proved embarrassing to the administration. The Spanish monarch very shrewdly delayed ratifying the treaty for two years and thus practically tied the hands of the administration during that time as far as the South American question was concerned.