Now it would be a considerable advance towards world government, if all
or most powerful States would consent to abandon separate alliances, or
subordinate them to a general alliance binding them to submit all
disputes to a process of impartial inquiry before attempting to enforce
their national will by arms. It may be that this is as far as it is
possible to go in the direction of securing world-peace and
international co-operation in the early future. If States will not carry
their co-operation so far as to agree upon united action to put down all
wars between their members, and to take a united stand against all
attacks from outside, it would be necessary to respect their scruples,
and to rely upon the softening influence of the moratorium and informed
public opinion to render a final recourse to arms unlikely among
civilized States. But, in considering the measure of security thus
achieved, we must remember that we must look to the weakest link in the
chain of the alliance, and ask ourselves how far the plan of
conciliation represented in the recent treaties between the United
States and several friendly European nations can be considered equally
secure in dealing with Germany, Russia, or Japan. If our international
arrangement is to dispense with all forcible pressure in the last
resort, and to rely upon purely moral pressure, it seems evident that
the validity of the arrangement depends upon the degree of confidence
which other States will entertain as to the bona fides and pacific
disposition of the least scrupulous of the powerful signatory States.
For if the opinion held of any one or two powerful States is that under
the stimulus of greed or ambition they would be likely, in defiance of
an award or of the public opinion of other States, to enforce their will
upon some weaker neighbour, such an opinion will keep alive so strong a
feeling of insecurity that no considerable reduction of military
preparations will be possible.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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