"Different methods of estimating the value of property may properly be employed when it is valued for different purposes. When a valuation is placed on property which has become affected by a public use, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the maximum rate of compensation fixed by law for its use is reasonable or otherwise, it is obvious that the income derived therefrom by the owner before it was subjected to legislative control cannot always be accepted as a proper test of value because the compensation which the owner charged for its use may have been excessive and unreasonable. Again, when property has been capitalized by issuing stock, neither the market value nor the par value of the stock can be accepted in all cases as a proper criterion of value, because the stock may not represent the money actually invested, and furthermore because the property may have been capitalized mainly with reference to its income producing capacity, on the assumption that it is ordinary private property which the owner may use as he thinks proper without being subject to legislative control. On the other hand, however, when property is valued for the purpose last stated, it is clear that the owner thereof is entitled to the benefit of any appreciation in value above the original cost and the cost of improvements, which is due to what may be termed natural causes. If improvements made in the vicinity of the property, the growth of city or town where it is located, the building of railroads, the development of the surrounding country and other like causes, give property an increased value, the owner cannot be deprived of such income by legislative action which prevents him from realizing an income commensurate with the enhanced value of his property." The language of the late Judge Brewer, sitting as one of the circuit judges in the case of National Water-Works Company _vs._ Kansas City (62 Fed., 853), is definite as to the necessity of taking into account some elements of intangible value, and is here quoted as giving the views of this eminent jurist: "The difficult question, however, still remains; and that is, what is the 'fair and equitable value,' which by the statute and ordinance the city is to pay for the water-works? * * * We are not satisfied that either method, by itself, will show that which under all the circumstances can be adjudged the 'fair and equitable value.'