"The third method of statement has been accurately, though colloquially, described as a 'nuisance value,' and is so obviously illegitimate as to require no discussion. The second method of statement, when carefully considered, asserts that because the sovereign has deemed it advisable to entrust a public work to one citizen or a body of citizens such quasi monopolistic grant confers the right to charge for the service more than would be just or lawful were the occupation open to all. Nor does it change the truth of the last statement that the difficulty of procuring franchises produces, and long has produced, a traffic in them. On every private sale of franchise property, the price paid is so much money lost to the public by official incompetence or worse, and such sale can confer on the vendee no right to compel the consumer to repay him a price that should have been paid to the State. For these reasons, I believe that on principle a franchise should be held to have no value except that arising from its use as a shield to protect those investing their property on the faith thereof, and that, it renders fruitful, it possesses no more economic value for the investor than does an actual shield possess fighting value, apart from the soldier who bears it." It will not do to leave this decision without calling attention to the fact that the foregoing quotations are but argument advanced by the Court, and that he found a franchise value, following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in cases cited heretofore, and other cases, and upon the doctrine that: "Private citizens may acquire vested property rights through a series of even erroneous decisions; rights so firmly vested that it becomes unconstitutional for the court which persisted in error suddenly to rectify its mistakes to the detriment of those who had securely rested upon the decisions sought to be invalidated." After citing numerous cases, and considering methods of valuing franchises, the Court says: