But--our adversary objects--the instance is not truly analogous. In the case of the snake-rope the non-reality of the snake results from the snake's being sublated (bâdhita) by the cognition of the true nature of the substrate 'This is a rope, not a snake'; it does not result from the non-continuousness of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persistence, but from the fact of its being not sublated (by another cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the non-reality of jars and pieces of cloth?--All are agreed, we reply, that we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference (vyâvritti, literally 'separation,' 'distinction'). The point to decide is of what nature such difference is. Does it not mean that the judgment 'This is a jar' implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other things? But this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other things are sublated (bâdhita). Individual difference (vyâvritti) thus means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain objects of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of whatever has non-continuous existence; while on the other hand, pure Being, like the rope, persists non-sublated. Hence everything that is additional to pure Being is non-real.--This admits of being expressed in technical form. 'Being' is real because it persists, as proved by the case of the rope in the snake-rope; jars and similar things are non-real because they are non-continuous, as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for its substrate. From all this it follows that persisting consciousness only has real being; it alone is. Being and consciousness are one. Consciousness is svayamprakâsa.