The Victories of Wellington and the British ArmiesMaxwell, W. H. (William Hamilton)
History
The Victories of Wellington and the British Armies
Maxwell, W. H. (William Hamilton)
Great Britain -- History, Military -- 19th century; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 1769-1852
Barosa, though not a high hill, rises considerably above the rugged
plain it overlooks, and stands four miles inland from the débouchement
of the Santi Petri. The plain is bounded on the right by the forest of
Chiclana, on the left by cliffs on the sea-beach, and on the centre by
a pine wood, beyond which the hill of Bermeja rises.
The irregularity and tardiness of the Spanish movements gave a
portentous warning of what might be expected from them in the field.
They occupied fifteen hours in executing a moderate march, passing over
the ground in a rambling and disorderly manner, that seemed rather like
peasants wandering from a fair, than troops moving in the presence
of an enemy. La Pena, without waiting to correct his broken ranks,
sent on a vanguard to Zayas; while his rear, entirely separated from
the centre, was still straggling over the country,--and contrary to
the expressed wishes of Graham, who implored him to hold Barosa, he
declined his advice, and ordered the British to march through the pine
wood on Bermeja. Graham, supposing that Anglona’s division and the
cavalry would continue to occupy the hill, leaving the flank companies
of the 9th and 82nd to protect his baggage, obeyed the order, and
commenced his march. But the astonishment of the English general was
unbounded, when, on entering the wood, he saw La Pena moving his entire
corps from the heights of Barosa, with the exception of three or four
battalions and as many pieces of artillery.
Unfortunately, the English General was not the only person who had
observed that Barosa was abandoned. Victor, concealed in the forest
of Chiclana, anxiously watched the movements of the allies. He saw
the fatal error committed by the Spanish leader--and instantly
made dispositions to profit from the ignorance and obstinacy of his
antagonist.
The French Marshal, having selected three grenadier battalions as
reserves, strengthened his left wing with two, and three squadrons of
cavalry, while the other was attached to his centre. Ruffin commanded
the left, Laval the centre; while Villatte, with two thousand five
hundred infantry, covered the camp, and watched the Spaniards at Santa
Petri and Bermeja. The cavalry, stationed at Medina and Arcos, were
ordered by Victor to move on Vejer and cut off the allies--for on
their certain defeat the French General entertained no doubt.
The time was admirably chosen for a decisive movement. The British
corps were defiling through the wood--the strength of the Spaniards
posted on the Bermeja--another division pursued a straggling march
on Vejer--and a fourth, in great confusion, was at Barosa, as a
protection to the baggage. Making Villatte’s division a pivot, Victor
pushed Laval at once against the British,--and ascending the back of
the hill with Ruffin’s brigade, he threw himself between the Spaniards
and Medina, dispersed the camp followers in an instant, and captured
the guns and baggage.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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