"(4) Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting officers from forwarding to the department, through official channels, well-considered comment and suggestions with a view to promoting the efficiency of the service and the public interests; on the contrary, such suggestions are invited, but they should be in regard to things or methods and not a criticism of persons, and should in all cases be accompanied by a well-digested plan for improvement. Such suggestions, if approved by the department, will be entered on the officer's record and he will be duly notified to that effect." APPENDIX II FIRST CABLE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON To: Secretary of the Navy. Sent April 14, 1917. Through: State Department. File No. 25-9-2. The situation is as follows: The submarine issue is very much more serious than the people realize in America. The recent success of operations and the rapidity of construction constitute the real crisis of the war. The _moral_ of the enemy submarines is not broken, only about fifty-four are known to have been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders have been recorded. The reports of our press are greatly in error. Recent reports circulated concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy _moral_ and results are [not] very satisfactory. Supplies and communications of forces all fronts, including the Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually imperilled. German submarines are constantly extending their operations into the Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling. Russian situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-five admirals, captains, and commanders murdered, and in some armies there is insubordination. The amount of British, neutral and Allied shipping lost in February was 536,000 tons, in March, 517,000 tons, and in the first ten days of April 205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather these losses are increasing. The British forces could not effectively prevent the escape of some raiders during the long nights, but the chances are better now. The Allies were notified that hospital ships will continue to be sunk, this in order to draw destroyers away from operations against submarines to convoy hospital ships; in this way causing a large demand for large convoy forces in all areas not before necessary, and also partially immobilizing the main fleet.