The Voice of Science in Nineteenth-Century Literature: Representative Prose and Verse
Science
The Voice of Science in Nineteenth-Century Literature: Representative Prose and Verse
English literature -- 19th century; Literature, Modern; Science; Science in literature
In criticism, these are elementary laws; but they never can be popular,
and in this country they have been very little followed, and one meets
with immense obstacles in following them. That is a reason for asserting
them again and again. Criticism must maintain its independence of the
practical spirit and its aims. Even with well-meant efforts of the
practical spirit, it must express dissatisfaction, if in the sphere of the
ideal they seem impoverishing and limiting. It must not hurry on to the
goal because of its practical importance. It must be patient, and know how
to wait; and flexible, and know how to attach itself to things and how to
withdraw from them. It must be apt to study and praise elements that for
the fulness of spiritual perfection are wanted, even though they belong to
a power that in the practical sphere may be maleficent. It must be apt to
discern the spiritual shortcomings or illusions of powers that in the
practical sphere may be beneficent. And this without any notion of
favoring or injuring, in the practical sphere, one power or the other;
without any notion of playing off, in this sphere, one power against the
other. When one looks, for instance, at the English Divorce Court,--an
institution which perhaps has its practical conveniences, but which in the
ideal sphere is so hideous; an institution which neither makes divorce
impossible nor makes it decent; which allows a man to get rid of his wife,
or a wife of her husband, but makes them drag one another first, for the
public edification, through a mire of unutterable infamy,--when one looks
at this charming institution, I say, with its crowded trials, its
newspaper reports, and its money compensations, this institution in which
the gross unregenerate British Philistine has indeed stamped an image of
himself, one may be permitted to find the marriage theory of Catholicism
refreshing and elevating. Or when Protestantism, in virtue of its supposed
rational and intellectual origin, gives the law to criticism too
magisterially, criticism may and must remind it that its pretensions, in
this respect, are illusive and do it harm; that the Reformation was a
moral rather than an intellectual event; that Luther's theory of grace no
more exactly reflects the mind of the spirit than Bossuet's philosophy of
history reflects it; and that there is no more antecedent probability of
the Bishop of Durham's stock of ideas being agreeable to perfect reason
than of Pope Pius the Ninth's. But criticism will not on that account
forget the achievements of Protestantism in the practical and moral
sphere; nor that, even in the intellectual sphere, Protestantism, though
in a blind and stumbling manner, carried forward the Renaissance, while
Catholicism threw itself violently across its path.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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