The 47th (London) Division to which the 1/4th Londons were now attached had just withdrawn for a period of rest and reorganisation from the trenches around Loos where they had seen a good deal of heavy fighting in the battle of the 25th September. The Division had come out from England in March 1915 and had first been engaged as the extreme right Division of the British Army at Festubert in May. Although serious losses had been suffered in the attacks on Hill 70 in September, the battalions of the Division had subsequently received strong reinforcements from home, and the majority of them were far larger than the 1/4th Londons who, at the date of attachment to the Division, numbered only 24 officers and 435 other ranks. The Division, which was under command of Major-Gen. C. St L. Barter, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., comprised the following Infantry Brigades: 140TH INFANTRY BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. G. Cuthbert, C.B. 1/4th London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). 1/6th " " (Rifles). 1/7th " " 1/8th " " (Post Office Rifles). 1/15th " " (Civil Service Rifles). 141ST INFANTRY BRIGADE 1/17th London Regiment (Poplar and Stepney Rifles). 1/18th " " (London Irish Rifles). 1/19th " " (St Pancras). 1/20th " " (Blackheath and Woolwich). 142ND INFANTRY BRIGADE 1/3rd London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). 1/21st " " (First Surrey Rifles). 1/22nd " " (The Queen's), Kennington. 1/23rd " " (East Surrey, Clapham Junction). 1/24th " " (The Queen's), Bermondsey. PIONEER BATTALION 4th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. The Division was attached to the IV Corps (Rawlinson) of the First Army (Haig). The first day after arrival at Lillers (16th November 1915) was devoted by the Battalion to cleaning up uniforms and equipment which had, through the prolonged duty in waterlogged trenches, become caked with weeks of mud. The general discipline of the 47th Division and of the 140th Brigade in particular was exceedingly good; and although the battle discipline of the Lahore Division had been excellent, and the training and experience which the 1/4th Londons had gained while attached to it of the highest order, yet it cannot be gainsaid that the parade discipline among the Indian Brigades had not been given that amount of attention which the long years of war showed to be necessary, even in the field, to ensure the best results in action. We have already indicated that this weakness in the Indian Brigades arose through their continual deficiency in numbers and the consequent long periods of trench duty which had been imposed on them.