These dissensions were also increased by the disheartening effects on the Allied officers of the great losses they had sustained in the campaign against the Americans. It is difficult to estimate the numbers the Allies had actually brought into the field before the retreat from Granada was accomplished, but it is certainly no exaggeration to place the troops they had employed from the beginning of October to the middle of December at seven thousand. In addition to the losses at Granada on the 12th and 13th of October, on the Transit road, by the affairs of the 11th and 12th of November, and at Masaya, during the three days fighting there, the Allies must have lost near two thousand men by the attack they made on Henningsen. Reports concur in the fact that Belloso had not more than two thousand under his command after he retired to Masaya. Thus, even placing the deserters at fifteen hundred—and you must place these at a high figure, considering the forced character of the service in Central America—the enemy must have lost thirty-five hundred in killed and wounded during the ten weeks immediately succeeding their march from Leon. Nor did Belloso entirely escape the cholera after he reached Masaya. Hence fear of the pestilence as well as of the deadly rifles of the Americans, stimulated desertion among the Allies. So disorganized did Belloso’s force become, that the propriety of a retreat on Leon was discussed among the chiefs of the several contingents; and the Salvadorian troops, particularly, were disposed to withdraw from the contest. The Salvadorian cabinet were, it seems, not well pleased with the censures some of the generals of the other States had passed on the commander-in-chief; and a large portion of the Liberal party of that State, unmoved by the passions which prompted Cabañas’ friends to revenge themselves on the Americans for the refusal to re-establish his power in Honduras, consistently refused to support the war waged against the naturalized Nicaraguans.