Thither they proceeded and arrived the same evening. On acquainting Hassan Pacha with their mission, he was easily persuaded to return to Jerusalem; they then pushed forward, but instead of getting information from the authorities, Abder Rahman, the scheik of the El-Halil district, plainly told them that he would neither give them information nor assistance, and there is no doubt whatever he was acting under orders from the Turkish authorities. Abder Rahman must have known where Ibrahim’s army was, because he had just returned from Maan, to which place he had accompanied the Baron Dumont on his excursion to destroy the magazines; in which, however, the Baron failed, as Souliman’s division had passed through the day before and pretty nearly cleared the stores. Finding it impossible to advance with any prospect of meeting Ibrahim, they returned to Gaza, where they found Achmet Menekli Pacha had arrived with the greater part of the cavalry. He made bitter complaints of the conduct of the Arabs, and Lieutenant Loring immediately proceeded to Jaffa to remonstrate with the Turkish authorities on the conduct of their officers. From Jaffa he returned to Gaza with Captain Stewart and Colonel Rose, accompanied by Rechid Pacha, and everything appeared settled in an amicable manner with Achmet Pacha to facilitate as much as possible the evacuation of Syria. Mr. Loring was present some hours after, when Rechid Pacha, to the utter astonishment of the British officers, declared his intention of immediately returning to Jaffa, confessing at the same time that he had sent orders for the advance of the Turkish troops to endeavour to cut off the communication between the division at Gaza and those hourly expected from the Desert. As has been already shown[76], the spirited remonstrance of Captain Stewart and Colonel Bridgeman put a stop to this infamous proceeding. Footnote 64: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 292, 301, 307, 366, 367. Footnote 65: See page 124. Footnote 66: See General Jochmus’s letter and accompanying statement, in _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 305-307. Footnote 67: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 282, 332. Footnote 68: Ibid., pp. 309, 310. Footnote 69: Ibid., p. 307. Footnote 70: “Does not this division of Ibrahim’s army at El-Mezereib at once convince any military man that he considered peace as concluded; and that a want of provisions was the only enemy he had to fear? he therefore divided his troops, so that one arm should not retard the other. “Cavalry, by forced marches, were enabled to get on faster than the infantry, encumbered as they were by women, &c., and barley was no doubt very scarce.