The War with Mexico, Volume 2 (of 2)Smith, Justin Harvey
History
The War with Mexico, Volume 2 (of 2)
Smith, Justin Harvey
Mexican War, 1846-1848
Bearing in mind the necessity, not merely of taking Vera Cruz and Ulúa,
but of getting his army away from the coast before the advent of yellow
fever, and satisfied that Polk would show him no mercy in case of
ill-success, General Scott examined his problem with all possible care,
and consulted freely the officers he particularly trusted.[22.10] He
could not very prudently have left, say, 5000 men to mask or possibly
reduce Vera Cruz, as some critics insisted he should have done, and
advanced with the rest, for the essential purpose of his expedition was
to capture that place, and such a course might have been viewed by the
government as insubordinate. Besides, that policy would probably have
been regarded by the Mexicans as a sign of weakness; the possession
of the harbor and shipping facilities would evidently aid all further
operations; by holding them it would be possible to deprive the enemy
of war supplies and other necessaries; the arms, ammunition and cannon
of the Mexicans were highly valuable, especially to them; and the
American army would not have been an adequate aggressive force after
thus detaching nearly half its numbers. The obstacle before Scott had,
therefore, to be faced and overcome.[22.13]
The best method, evidently, was to reduce the town before seriously
attacking Ulúa, because that success would greatly diminish the
enemy's fire, make it possible to contract and so strengthen the
American line, and somewhat facilitate the transportation of supplies.
Such had been the General's plan from the first. Officers eager for
distinction recommended an assault, and Scott well knew that a quick,
brilliant stroke would best win him fame and popularity.[22.11] But he
understood equally well that an assault, necessarily made at night,
would entail a heavy loss of his best men--enough, perhaps, to prevent
his advancing farther and escaping the pestilence--besides involving a
great slaughter of both combatants and non-combatants in the town. On
the other hand, as the British consul and the British naval commander
agreed, there was not enough time before the yellow fever season to
warrant relying upon starvation alone.[22.12] Siege and bombardment
were therefore indicated, and Scott promptly decided upon that plan as
combining, better than any other, humanity with effectiveness.[22.13]
[THE DEBARKATION]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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