Engineers Beauregard and Tower had by this time done some reconnoitring, and, as indeed would have been fairly obvious to any intelligent person, had concluded that a turning movement against the Mexican left--toward which a trail had been found to lead--offered the best hope. But an idea was not a plan. The reconnaissances were far from complete, and reports upon the Mexican position and numbers differed materially. Hence the commander-in-chief, who accepted everything valuable done by his subordinates but never surrendered his own judgment, decided to begin anew, and, in the hope of gaining the highway in Santa Anna's rear and cutting off his entire army, sent Captain Lee at once to the ravines.[23.21] Friday that indefatigable engineer found himself in contact with the Mexican lines far to the rear of El Telégrafo. Reconnoitring could go no farther, and the highway toward Jalapa was not actually seen; but there were good reasons for believing it near, and the construction of a "road" for troops and artillery on the route discovered by Lee was pressed with great energy. At about 9 o'clock on Friday evening all the facts and conclusions were brought together in a plan by Major John L. Smith, senior engineer on the ground, and in substance his plan was adopted. Its essential point was, in accordance with Scott's announced aim, to gain the highway in the Mexican rear first of all, and then--not until then--attack in the rear and perhaps also on the front.[23.22] After the adjournment of this conference the army was further cheered by the arrival of Worth, 1600 picked men and a number of heavy guns. The Mexican forces were estimated as 12-18,000, and Scott had only 8500; but the bright stars of that night looked down on an army sleeping soundly in full courage and confidence.[23.23] [PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS] At seven or eight o'clock the next morning Twiggs advanced. His instructions were to avoid a collision, occupy La Atalaya, reach the Mexican left, and rest on his arms near the highway until the remainder of the army should be in position, and the time for acting decisively should arrive. Accordingly, after marching about three miles along the highway he turned off to the right by the road already cut, ordering the men to trail arms and preserve absolute silence. At one point the road lay for twenty-five or thirty feet in view of the enemy, and Lee proposed to screen it with brush. But this appeared to Twiggs quite unnecessary, and hence the Mexicans could observe not only the troops but four mountain howitzers, four 6-pounders, and two 12-pounders gleaming in the sun. Pinzón and also the outpost on La Atalaya notified Santa Anna of the American movement, and strong reinforcements were therefore despatched to that hill.[23.26] [Illustration: BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO CENTRAL PART OF THE FIELD]