The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book I and IINietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
PhilosophyPhilosophy
The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book I and II
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
Nihilism (Philosophy); Power (Philosophy); Values
What has been _calumniated_? That which has tended to separate higher
men from their inferiors, the instincts which cleave gulfs and build
barriers.
33.
Causes effecting the _rise of Pessimism_:--
(1) The most powerful instincts and those which promised most for the
future have hitherto been _calumniated,_ so that life has a curse upon
it.
(2) The growing bravery and the more daring mistrust on the part of man
have led him to discover the fact that _these instincts cannot be
cut adrift from life,_ and thus he turns to embrace life.
(3) Only the most _mediocre,_ who are not _conscious_ of this conflict,
prosper; the higher species fail, and as an example of degeneration
tend to dispose all hearts against them--on the other hand, there is
some indignation caused by the mediocre positing themselves as the end
and meaning of all things. No one can any longer reply to the question:
"Why?"
(4) Belittlement, susceptibility to pain, unrest, haste, and confusion
are steadily increasing--the materialisation of all these tendencies,
which is called "civilisation," becomes every day more simple, with
the result that, in the face of the monstrous machine, the individual
_despairs_ and _surrenders._
34.
Modern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessness only of the
_modern_ world, not of the world and existence as such.
35.
The "preponderance of _pain over pleasure"_ or the reverse (Hedonism);
both of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism....
For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the
phenomenon pleasure or pain.
But only a man who no longer dares to posit a will, a purpose, and a
final goal can speak in this way--according to every healthy type of
man, the worth of life is certainly not measured by the standard of
these secondary things. And a _preponderance_ of pain would be possible
and, _in spite of it,_ a mighty will, a _saying of yea_ to life, and a
holding of this preponderance for necessary.
"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation"; "what is the good of
tears?"--this is a feeble and sentimental attitude of mind. "_Un
monstre gai vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux._"
36.
The philosophie Nihilist is convinced that all phenomena are without
sense and are in vain, and that there ought to be no such thing as
Being without sense and in vain. But whence comes this "There ought
not to be?"--whence this "sense" and _this standard_? At bottom the
Nihilist supposes that the sight of such a desolate, useless Being is
_unsatisfying_ to the philosopher, and fills him with desolation and
despair. This aspect of the case is opposed to our subtle sensibilities
as a philosopher. It leads to the absurd conclusion that the character
of existence _must perforce afford pleasure to the philosopher_ if it
is to have any right to subsist.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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