What are _attributes_?--We did not regard changes in ourselves merely as such, but as "things in themselves," which are strange to us, and which we only "perceive"; and we did _not_ class them as phenomena, but as Being, as "attributes"; and in addition we invented a creature to which they attach themselves--that is to say, we made the _effect_ the _working cause,_ and _the latter_ we made _Being._ But even in this plain statement, the concept "effect" is arbitrary: for in regard to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced we ourselves are _not_ the cause, we still argue that they must be effects: and this is in accordance with the belief that "every change must have its author";--but this belief in itself is already mythology; for it _separates_ the working _cause from_ the cause in work. When I say the "lightning flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a thing is fancifully affixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with it, but which is _stable,_ which _is,_ and does not "come."--_To make the phenomenon the working cause,_ and to make _the effect into a thing--into Being:_ this is the _double_ error, or _interpretation,_ of which we are guilty. 532. The _Judgment_--that is the faith: "This and this is so. In every judgment, therefore, there lies the admission that an "identical" case has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for granted, with the help of the memory. Judgment does _not_ create the idea that an identical case seems to be there. It believes rather that it actually perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that there are such things as identical cases. But what is that much _older_ function called, which must have been active much earlier, and which in itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike? What is that second function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc, "That which provokes the same sensations as another thing is equal to that other thing": but what is that called which makes sensations equal, which regards them as equal?--There could be no judgments if a sort of equalising process were not active within all sensations: memory is only possible by means of the underscoring of all that has already been experienced and learned. Before a judgment can be formed, _the process of assimilation must already have been completed_: thus, even here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does not enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which accompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all the organic functions--that is to say, they consist of assimilation, rejection, growth, etc. The essential thing is to start out from the body and to use it as the general clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much more accurate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly established than the belief in spirit.