The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IVNietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
PhilosophyPhilosophy
The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
Nihilism (Philosophy); Power (Philosophy); Values
We believed that an effect was explained when we could point to a state
in which it was inherent. As a matter of fact, we invent all causes
according to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to us.... On
the other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing
how it will "act." The thing, the subject the will, the design--all
inherent in the conception "cause." We try to discover things in order
to explain why something has changed. Even the "atom" is one of these
fanciful inventions like the "thing" and the "primitive subject."...
At last we understand that things--consequently also atoms--effect
nothing: _because they are non-existent;_ and that the concept
causality is quite! useless. Out of a necessary sequence of states,
the latter's causal relationship does _not_ follow (that would be
equivalent to extending their _active principle_ from 1 to 2, to 3, to
4, to 5). _There is no such thing as a cause or an effect._ From the
standpoint of language we do not know how to rid ourselves of them.
But that does not matter. If I imagine _muscle_ separated from its
"effects," I have denied it....
In short: _a phenomenon is neither effected nor capable of effecting.
Causa_ is a _faculty to effect something,_ superadded fancifully to
what happens....
_The interpretation of causality is an illusion...._ A "thing" is the
sum of its effects, synthetically united by means of a concept, an
image. As a matter of fact, science has robbed the concept causality
of all meaning, and has reserved it merely as an allegorical formula,
which has made it a matter of indifference whether cause or effect be
put on this side or on that. It is asserted that in two complex states
(centres of force) the quantities of energy remain constant.
_The calculability of a phenomenon_ does not lie in the fact that
a rule is observed, or that a necessity is obeyed, or that we have
projected a law of causality into every phenomenon: it lies in the
_recurrence of "identical cases."_
There is no such thing as a _sense of causality,_ as Kant would have
us believe. We are aghast, we feel insecure, we will have something
familiar, which can be relied upon.... As soon as we are shown the
existence of something old in a new thing, we are pacified. The
so-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the _fear of
the unfamiliar_, and the attempt at finding something in it which is
already _known._--It is not a search for causes, but for the familiar.
552.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account