The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV — John Shaqi
The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IVNietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
PhilosophyPhilosophy
The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
Nihilism (Philosophy); Power (Philosophy); Values
_Conscientiousness in small things,_ the self-control of the religious
man, was a preparatory school for the scientific character, as was
also, in a very pre-eminent sense, the attitude of mind which makes a
man _take problems seriously,_ irrespective of what personal advantage
he may derive from them....
_(b)_ The Starting-point of Epistemology.
470.
Profound disinclination to halt once and for all at any collective view
of the world. The charm of the opposite point of view: the refusal to
relinquish the stimulus residing in the enigmatical.
471.
The hypothesis that, at bottom, things proceed in such a moral fashion
that _human reason must be right,_ is a mere piece of good-natured
and simple-minded trustfulness, the result of the belief in Divine
truthfulness--God regarded as the Creator of all things.--These
concepts are our inheritance from a former existence in a Beyond.
472.
The contradiction of the so-called "facts of consciousness."
Observation a thousand times more difficult, error is perhaps the
absolute _condition_ of observation.
473.
The intellect cannot criticise itself, simply because it can be
compared with no other kind of intellect, and also because its ability
to know would only reveal itself in the presence of "actual reality";
that is to say, because, in order to criticise the intellect, we should
have to be higher creatures with "absolute knowledge." This would
presuppose the existence of _something,_ a "thing-in-itself," apart
from all the perspective kinds of observation and senso-spiritual
perception. But the psychological origin of the belief in _things,_
forbids our speaking of "things in themselves."
474.
The idea that a sort of adequate relation exists between _subject_ and
_object,_ that the object is something which _when seen from inside_
would be a subject, is a well-meant invention which, I believe, has
seen its best days. The measure of that which we are conscious of, is
perforce entirely dependent upon the coarse utility of the function of
consciousness: how could this little garret-prospect of consciousness
warrant our asserting anything in regard to "subject" and "object,"
which would bear any relation to reality!
475.
Criticism of modern philosophy: erroneous starting-point, as if there
were such things as "facts of consciousness"--and no _phenomenalism_ in
_introspection._
476.
"Consciousness"--to what extent is the idea which is thought of, the
idea of will, or the idea of a feeling (_which is known by us alone_),
quite superficial? Our _inner_ world is also "appearance."
477.
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