The Winning of the West, Volume 3: The Founding of the Trans-Alleghany Commonwealths, 1784-1790 — John Shaqi
The Winning of the West, Volume 3: The Founding of the Trans-Alleghany Commonwealths, 1784-1790Roosevelt, Theodore
History
The Winning of the West, Volume 3: The Founding of the Trans-Alleghany Commonwealths, 1784-1790
Roosevelt, Theodore
Northwest, Old -- History; United States -- Territorial expansion; West (U.S.) -- History
The Federal Government still feebly hoped for peace; and in the vain
endeavors to avoid irritating the Indians forbade all hostile
expeditions into the Indian country--though these expeditions offered
the one hope of subduing the savages and preventing their inroads. By
1786 the settlers generally, including all their leaders, such as Clark,
[Footnote: _Do_., No. 50, p. 279. Clark to R. H. Lee.] had become
convinced that the treaties were utterly futile, and that the only right
policy was one of resolute war.
The War Inevitable.
In truth the war was unavoidable. The claims and desires of the two
parties were irreconcilable. Treaties and truces were palliatives which
did not touch the real underlying trouble. The white settlers were
unflinchingly bent on seizing the land over which the Indians roamed but
which they did not in any true sense own or occupy. In return the
Indians were determined at all costs and hazards to keep the men of
chain and compass, and of axe and rifle, and the forest-felling settlers
who followed them, out of their vast and lonely hunting-grounds. Nothing
but the actual shock of battle could decide the quarrel. The display of
overmastering, overwhelming force might have cowed the Indians; but it
was not possible for the United States, or for any European power, ever
to exert or display such force far beyond the limits of the settled
country. In consequence the warlike tribes were not then, and never have
been since, quelled save by actual hard fighting, until they were
overawed by the settlement of all the neighboring lands.
Nor was there any alternative to these Indian wars. It is idle folly to
speak of them as being the fault of the United States Government; and it
is even more idle to say that they could have been averted by treaty.
Here and there, under exceptional circumstances or when a given tribe
was feeble and unwarlike, the whites might gain the ground by a treaty
entered into of their own free will by the Indians, without the least
duress; but this was not possible with warlike and powerful tribes when
once they realized that they were threatened with serious encroachment
on their hunting-grounds. Moreover, looked at from the standpoint of the
ultimate result, there was little real difference to the Indian whether
the land was taken by treaty or by war. In the end the Delaware fared no
better at the hands of the Quaker than the Wampanoag at the hands of the
Puritan; the methods were far more humane in the one case than in the
other, but the outcome was the same in both. No treaty could be
satisfactory to the whites, no treaty served the needs of humanity and
civilization, unless it gave the land to the Americans as unreservedly
as any successful war.
Our Dealings with the Indians.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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