The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
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Extension being the collection or distinct co-existence of minimums, i.e.
of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch, it cannot be conceiv’d
without a perceiving substance.
(M400) Malbranch does not prove that the figures & extensions exist not
when they are not perceiv’d. Consequently he does not prove, nor can it be
prov’d on his principles, that the sorts are the work of the mind, and
onely in the mind.
(M401) The great argument to prove that extension cannot be in an
unthinking substance is, that it cannot be conceiv’d distinct from or
without all tangible or visible quality.
(M402) Tho’ matter be extended wth an indefinite extension, yet the mind
makes the sorts. They were not before the mind perceiving them, & even now
they are not without the mind. Houses, trees, &c., tho’ indefinitely
extended matter do exist, are not without the mind.
(M403) The great danger of making extension exist without the mind is,
that if it does it must be acknowledg’d infinite, immutable, eternal,
&c.;—wch will be to make either God extended (wch I think dangerous), or
an eternal, immutable, infinite, increate Being beside God.
(M404) Finiteness of our minds no excuse for the geometers.
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(M405) The Principle easily proved by plenty of arguments _ad absurdum_.
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The twofold signification of Bodies, viz.
1. Combinations of thoughts(239);
2. Combinations of powers to raise thoughts.
These, I say, in conjunction with homogeneous particles, may solve much
better the objections from the creation than the supposition that Matter
does exist. Upon wch supposition I think they cannot be solv’d.
Bodies taken for powers do exist wn not perceiv’d; but this existence is
not actual(240). Wn I say a power exists, no more is meant than that if in
the light I open my eyes, and look that way, I shall see it, i.e. the
body, &c.
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Qu. whether blind before sight may not have an idea of light and colours &
visible extension, after the same manner as we perceive them wth eyes
shut, or in the dark—not imagining, but seeing after a sort?
Visible extension cannot be conceiv’d added to tangible extension. Visible
and tangible points can’t make one sum. Therefore these extensions are
heterogeneous.
A probable method propos’d whereby one may judge whether in near vision
there is a greater distance between the crystalline & fund than usual, or
whether the crystalline be onely render’d more convex. If the former, then
the v. s. is enlarg’d, & the m. v. corresponds to less than 30 minutes, or
wtever it us’d to correspond to.
Stated measures, inches, feet, &c., are tangible not visible extensions.
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