The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
(M412) Qu. Why should the magnitude seen at a near distance be deem’d the
true one rather than that seen at a farther distance? Why should the sun
be thought many 1000 miles rather than one foot in diameter—both being
equally apparent diameters? Certainly men judg’d of the sun not in
himself, but wth relation to themselves.
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(M413) 4 Principles whereby to answer objections, viz.
1. Bodies do really exist, tho’ not perceiv’d by us.
2. There is a law or course of nature.
3. Language & knowledge are all about ideas; words stand for
nothing else.
4. Nothing can be a proof against one side of a contradiction that
bears equally hard upon the other(244).
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What shall I say? Dare I pronounce the admired ἀκρίβεια mathematica, that
darling of the age, a trifle?
Most certainly no finite extension divisible _ad infinitum_.
(M414) Difficulties about concentric circles.
(M415) Mem. To examine & accurately discuss the scholium of the 8th
definition of Mr. Newton’s(245) Principia.
Ridiculous in the mathematicians to despise Sense.
Qu. Is it not impossible there should be abstract general ideas?
All ideas come from without. They are all particular. The mind, ’tis true,
can consider one thing wthout another; but then, considered asunder, they
make not 2 ideas. Both together can make but one, as for instance colour &
visible extension(246).
The end of a mathematical line is nothing. Locke’s argument that the end
of his pen is black or white concludes nothing here.
Mem. Take care how you pretend to define extension, for fear of the
geometers.
Qu. Why difficult to imagine a minimum? Ans. Because we are not used to
take notice of ’em singly; they not being able singly to pleasure or hurt
us, thereby to deserve our regard.
Mem. To prove against Keill yt the infinite divisibility of matter makes
the half have an equal number of equal parts with the whole.
Mem. To examine how far the not comprehending infinites may be admitted as
a plea.
Qu. Why may not the mathematicians reject all the extensions below the M.
as well as the dd, &c., wch are allowed to be something, & consequently
may be magnify’d by glasses into inches, feet, &c., as well as the
quantities next below the M.?
Big, little, and number are the works of the mind. How therefore can ye
extension you suppose in Matter be big or little? How can it consist of
any number of points?
(M416) Mem. Strictly to remark L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.
Schoolmen compar’d with the mathematicians.
Extension is blended wth tangible or visible ideas, & by the mind
præscinded therefrom.
Mathematiques made easy—the scale does almost all. The scale can tell us
the subtangent in ye parabola is double the abscisse.
Wt need of the utmost accuracy wn the mathematicians own _in rerum natura_
they cannot find anything corresponding wth their nice ideas.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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