The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
The next Part of the _Essay_ (sect. 121-45) argues for a specific as well
as a numerical difference between the original data of sight and the data
of touch and locomotion. Sight and touch perceive nothing in common.
Extension in its various relations differs in sight from extension in
touch. Coloured extension, which alone is visible, is found to be
different in kind from resistant extension, which alone is tangible. And
if actually perceived or concrete extensions differ thus, the question is
determined. For all extension with which man can be concerned must be
concrete (sect. 23). Extension in the abstract is meaningless (sect.
124-25). What remains is to marshal the scattered evidence, and to guard
the foregoing conclusions against objections. This is attempted in
sections 128-46.
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The enunciation of the summary generalisation, which forms the “New Theory
of Vision” (sect. 147-8), may be taken as the Fifth and culminating Part
of the _Essay_.
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The closing sections (149-60), as I have said, are supplementary, and
profess to determine the sort of extension—visible or tangible—with which
Geometry is concerned. In concluding that it is tangible, he tries to
picture the mental state of Idominians, or unbodied spirits, endowed with
visual perceptions _only_, and asks what _their_ conception of outness and
solid extension must be. Here further refinements in the interpretation of
visual perception, and its organic conditions, which have not escaped the
attention of latter psychologists and biologists, are hinted at.
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Whether the data of sight consist of non-resembling arbitrary Signs of the
tactual distances, sizes, and situations of things, is a question which
some might prefer to deal with experimentally—by trial of the experience
of persons in circumstances fitted to supply an answer. Of this sort would
be the experience of the born-blind, immediately after their sight has
been restored; the conception of extension and its relations found in
persons who continue from birth unable to see; the experience (if it could
be got) of persons always destitute of all tactual and locomotive
perceptions, but familiar with vision; and the facts of seeing observed in
infants of the human species, and in the lower animals.
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