The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
Berkeley did not try to verify his conclusions in this way. Here and there
(sect. 41, 42, 79, 92-99, 103, 106, 110, 128, 132-37), he conjectures what
the first visual experience of those rescued from born-blindness is likely
to be; he also speculates, as we have seen, about the experience of
unbodied spirits supposed to be able to see, but unable to touch or move
(sect. 153-59); and in the Appendix he refers, in confirmation of his New
Theory, to a reported case of one born blind who had obtained sight. But
he forms his Theory independently of those delicate and difficult
investigations. His testing facts were sought introspectively. Indeed
those physiologists and mental philosophers who have since tried to
determine what vision in its purity is, by cases either of communicated
sight or of continued born-blindness, have illustrated the truth of
Diderot’s remark—“préparer et interroger un aveugle-né n’eût point été une
occupation indigne des talens réunis de Newton, Des Cartes, Locke, et
Leibniz(275).”
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Berkeley’s _New Theory_ has been quoted as a signal example of discovery
in metaphysics. The subtle analysis which distinguishes _seeing_ strictly
so called, from judgments about extended things, suggested by what we see,
appears to have been imperfectly known to the ancient philosophers.
Aristotle, indeed, speaks of colour as the only proper object of sight;
but, in passages of the _De Anima_(276) where he names properties peculiar
to particular senses, he enumerates others, such as motion, figure, and
magnitude, which belong to all the senses in common. His distinction of
Proper and Common Sensibles appears at first to contradict Berkeley’s
doctrine of the heterogeneity of the ideal visible and the real tangible
worlds. Aristotle, however, seems to question the immediate perceptibility
of Common Sensibles, and to regard them as realised through the activity
of intelligence(277).
Some writers in Optics, in mediaeval times, and in early modern
philosophy, advanced beyond Aristotle, in explaining the relation of our
matured notion of distance to what we originally perceive in seeing, and
in the fifteenth century it was discovered by Maurolyco that the rays of
light from the object converge to a focus in the eye; but I have not been
able to trace even the germ of the _New Theory_ in these speculations.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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