The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
63. Moreover, it is not only certain that any idea of sight might not have
been connected with this or that idea of touch we now observe to accompany
it, but also that the greater visible magnitudes might have been connected
with and introduced into our minds lesser tangible magnitudes, and the
lesser visible magnitudes greater tangible magnitudes. Nay, that it
actually is so, we have daily experience—that object which makes a strong
and large appearance not seeming near so great as another the visible
magnitude whereof is much less, but more faint,(353) and the appearance
upper, or which is the same thing, painted lower on the retina, which
faintness and situation suggest both greater magnitude and greater
distance.
64. From which, and from sect. 57 and 58, it is manifest that, as we do
not perceive the magnitude of objects immediately by sight, so neither do
we perceive them by the mediation of anything which has a necessary
connexion with them. Those ideas that now suggest unto us the various
magnitudes of external objects before we touch them might possibly have
suggested no such thing; or they might have signified them in a direct
contrary manner, so that the very same ideas on the perception whereof we
judge an object to be small might as well have served to make us conclude
it great;—those ideas being in their own nature equally fitted to bring
into our minds the idea of small or great, or no size at all, of outward
objects(354), just as the words of any language are in their own nature
indifferent to signify this or that thing, or nothing at all.
65. As we see distance so we see magnitude. And we see both in the same
way that we see shame or anger in the looks of a man. Those passions are
themselves invisible; they are nevertheless let in by the eye along with
colours and alterations of countenance which are the immediate object of
vision, and which signify them for no other reason than barely because
they have been observed to accompany them. Without which experience we
should no more have taken blushing for a sign of shame than of gladness.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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