The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
112. Or rather, to speak truly, the proper objects of sight are at no
distance, neither near nor far from any tangible thing. For, if we inquire
narrowly into the matter, we shall find that those things only are
compared together in respect of distance which exist after the same
manner, or appertain unto the same sense. For, by the distance between any
two points, nothing more is meant than the number of intermediate points.
If the given points are visible, the distance between them is marked out
by the number of the interjacent visible points; if they are tangible, the
distance between them is a line consisting of tangible points; but, if
they are one tangible and the other visible, the distance between them
doth neither consist of points perceivable by sight nor by touch, i.e. it
is utterly inconceivable(400). This, perhaps, will not find an easy
admission into all men’s understanding. However, I should gladly be
informed whether it be not true, by any one who will be at the pains to
reflect a little, and apply it home to his thoughts.
113. The not observing what has been delivered in the two last sections,
seems to have occasioned no small part of the difficulty that occurs in
the business of direct appearances. The head, which is painted nearest the
earth, seems to be farthest from it; and on the other hand, the feet,
which are painted farthest from the earth, are thought nearest to it.
Herein lies the difficulty, which vanishes if we express the thing more
clearly and free from ambiguity, thus:—How comes it that, to the eye, the
visible head, which is nearest the tangible earth, seems farthest from the
earth; and the visible feet, which are farthest from the tangible earth,
seem nearest the earth? The question being thus proposed, who sees not the
difficulty is founded on a supposition that the eye or visive faculty, or
rather the soul by means thereof, should judge of the situation of visible
objects with reference to their distance from the tangible earth? Whereas,
it is evident the tangible earth is not perceived by sight. And it hath
been shewn, in the two last preceding sections, that the location of
visible objects is determined only by the distance they bear from one
another, and that it is nonsense to talk of distance, far or near, between
a visible and tangible thing.
114. If we confine our thoughts to the proper objects of sight, the whole
is plain and easy. The head is painted farthest from, and the feet nearest
to, the visible earth; and so they appear to be. What is there strange or
unaccountable in this? Let us suppose the pictures in the fund of the eye
to be the immediate objects of sight(401). The consequence is that things
should appear in the same posture they are painted in; and is it not so?
The head which is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen; and
the feet which are seen seem nearest to the earth which is seen. And just
so they are painted.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account