which is without the representation of the pictures in _B_. For, if you take the little linages of the pictures in _B_, and consider them by themselves, and with respect only to one another, they are all erect and in their natural posture. 117. Farther, there lies a mistake in our imagining that the pictures of external(403) objects are painted on the bottom of the eye. It has been shewn there is no resemblance between the ideas of sight and things tangible. It hath likewise been demonstrated(404), that the proper objects of sight do not exist without the mind. Whence it clearly follows that the pictures painted on the bottom of the eye are not the pictures of external objects. Let any one consult his own thoughts, and then tell me, what affinity, what likeness, there is between that certain variety and disposition of colours which constitute the visible man, or picture of a man, and that other combination of far different ideas, sensible by touch, which compose the tangible man. But, if this be the case, how come they to be accounted pictures or images, since that supposes them to copy or represent some originals or other? 118. To which I answer—In the forementioned instance, the eye _A_ takes the little images, included within the representation of the other eye _B_, to be pictures or copies, whereof the archetypes are not things existing without(405), but the larger pictures(406) projected on its own fund; and which by _A_ are not thought pictures, but the originals or true things themselves. Though if we suppose a third eye _C_, from a due distance, to behold the fund of _A_, then indeed the things projected thereon shall, to _C_, seem pictures or images, in the same sense that those projected on _B_ do to _A_. 119. Rightly to conceive the business in hand, we must carefully distinguish between the ideas of sight and touch, between the visible and tangible eye; for certainly on the tangible eye nothing either is or seems to be painted. Again, the visible eye, as well as all other visible objects, hath been shewn to exist only in the mind(407); which, perceiving its own ideas, and comparing them together, does call some pictures in respect to others. What hath been said, being rightly comprehended and laid together, does, I think, afford a full and genuine explication of the erect appearance of objects—which phenomenon, I must confess, I do not see how it can be explained by any theories of vision hitherto made public.