The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the
hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion
before they rightly comprehend it(477).
Introduction
1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of Wisdom and Truth(478),
it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and
pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater
clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and
difficulties than other men. Yet, so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of
mankind, that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed
by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them
nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend.
They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of
all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and
instinct to follow the light of a superior principle—to reason, meditate,
and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in
our minds, concerning those things which before we seemed fully to
comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover
themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we
are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and
inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in
speculation; till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes,
we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a
forlorn Scepticism(479).
2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the
natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said the
faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support
and pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and
constitution of things: besides, the mind of man being finite, when it
treats of things which partake of Infinity, it is not to be wondered at if
it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible
it should ever extricate itself; it being of the nature of Infinite not to
be comprehended by that which is finite(480).
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