The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
change of motion is proportional to the impressed force,” or that
“whatever has extension is divisible,” these propositions are to be
understood of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will
not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an _idea_(492) of motion
without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity; or that I
must conceive an _abstract general idea_ of extension, which is neither
line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red,
nor of any other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever
particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular,
horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it
holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension; it
matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that
magnitude or figure(493).
12. By observing how ideas become general, we may the better judge how
words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny
absolutely there are _general ideas_, but only that there are any
_abstract general ideas_. For, in the passages we have quoted wherein
there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are
formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and
9(494). Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of
what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea, which
considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to
represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort(495).
To make this plain by an example. Suppose a geometrician is demonstrating
the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a
black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular
line, is nevertheless _with regard to its signification_ general; since,
as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so
that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other
words, of a line in general(496). And, as _that particular line_ becomes
general by being made a sign, so the _name_ line, which taken absolutely
is particular, by being a sign, is made general. And as the former owes
its generality, not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line,
but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter
must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the
various particular lines which it indifferently denotes.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account