The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
67. In the _twelfth_ place, it may perhaps be objected that—though it be
clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert,
senseless, extended, solid, figured, moveable Substance, existing without
the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter; yet, if any man shall
leave out of his idea of Matter the positive ideas of extension, figure,
solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert,
senseless substance, that exists without the mind, or unperceived, which
is the _occasion_ of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased
to excite ideas in us—it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this
sense may possibly exist.—In answer to which I say, first, that it seems
no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to
suppose accidents without a substance(644). But secondly, though we should
grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be
supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind(645) is agreed; and that it
exists not in place is no less certain, since all place or extension
exists only in the mind(646), as hath been already proved. It remains
therefore that it exists nowhere at all.
68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of
Matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived: for this is all
that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance;
which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the
relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be
observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the
description of a _nonentity_ I desire may be considered. But, say you, it
is the _unknown occasion_(647), at the presence of which ideas are excited
in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be
present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor
capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor
hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words “to be present,” when
thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning,
and which I am not able to comprehend.
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