The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
69. Again, let us examine what is meant by _occasion_. So far as I can
gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the
agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to
accompany or go before it, in the ordinary course of things. But, when it
is applied to Matter, as above described, it can be taken in neither of
those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be
an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of
all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions
in the latter sense; as when the burning my finger is said to be the
occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by
calling _matter_ an _occasion_? This term is either used in no sense at
all, or else in some very distant from its received signification.
70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is
nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting
ideas in our minds(648). For, say you, since we observe our sensations to
be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to
suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being
produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct
parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not
excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being
altogether passive, and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God,
by whom they _are_ perceived(649), as it were so many occasions to remind
Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds: that so things may go on
in a constant uniform manner.
71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here
stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing
distinct from _Spirit_ and _idea_, from perceiving and being perceived;
but whether there are not certain Ideas (of I know not what sort) in the
mind of God, which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to
produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method: much
after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to
produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a
tune; though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be
entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of Matter (which after all is
the only intelligible one that I can pick from what is said of unknown
occasions) seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is
in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is
no senseless unperceived substance.
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