The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their
stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses’ rod? was
it not _really_ turned into a serpent? or was there only a change of
_ideas_ in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our
Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the
sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the
appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other
miracles: which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be
looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy.—To this I
reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into
real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have
elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of
_real_ and _imaginary_ has been already so plainly and fully explained,
and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily
answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the
reader’s understanding to resume the explication of it in this place. I
shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and
smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me
there could be no doubt of its reality(663). So that at bottom the scruple
concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the
received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what
has been said.
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85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the
clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed
in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences(664).
Some of these appear at first sight—as that several difficult and obscure
questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are
entirely banished from philosophy. Whether corporeal substance can think?
Whether Matter be infinitely divisible? And how it operates on
spirit?—these and the like inquiries have given infinite amusement to
philosophers in all ages. But, depending on the existence of Matter, they
have no longer any place on our Principles. Many other advantages there
are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for
any one to deduce from what has been premised. But this will appear more
plainly in the sequel.
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86. From the Principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may
naturally be reduced to two heads—that of _ideas_ and that of _Spirits_.
Of each of these I shall treat in order.
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