The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are _real_ things, or do really
exist(677): this we do not deny; but we deny they _can_ subsist without
the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any
archetypes existing without the mind(678); since the very being of a
sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like
nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed
_external_, with regard to their origin; in that they are not generated
from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from
that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be
“without the mind” in another sense, namely when they exist in some other
mind. Thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist; but it
must be in another mind(679).
91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the
least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received
principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities,
have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But
the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations
of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves(680).
Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things
perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance or support
wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of
their _reality_, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the
difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by
sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot
therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible
substances, or _spirits_, which act, and think and perceive them. Whereas
philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an
inert, extended, unperceiving Substance, which they call _Matter_, to
which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking
beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the
Eternal Mind of the Creator; wherein they suppose only Ideas of the
corporeal substances(681) created by Him: if indeed they allow them to be
at all _created_(682).
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