The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies
than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the
force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies is
impressed. For, however some may define relative motion, so as to term
that body _moved_ which changes its distance from some other body, whether
the force [(712)or action] causing that change were impressed on it or no,
yet, as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded
in the ordinary affairs of life, it follows that every man of common sense
knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any one
whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones
he passes over may be said to _move_, because they change distance with
his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one
thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation
be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not
think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is not
therefore itself in motion, [(713) I mean relative motion, for other I am
not able to conceive.]
114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is
related to it varies(714). A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent
with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to
the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in
respect of the other. In the common affairs of life, men never go beyond
the Earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in
respect of _that_ is accounted _absolutely_ to be so. But philosophers,
who have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of
things, discover even the Earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to
fix their notions, they seem to conceive the Corporeal World as finite,
and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they
estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may
find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no
other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been already
observed, absolute motion, exclusive of _all_ external relation, is
incomprehensible: and to this kind of relative motion all the
above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute
motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of
the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular relative
motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought
to prove it. See Newton’s _Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica,
in Schol. Def. VIII_. For the water in the vessel, at that time wherein it
is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, hath, I think, no
motion at all: as is plain from the foregoing section.
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