The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13; from which,
and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is
not any such idea. But, number being defined a _collection of units_, we
may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity, or unit in
abstract, there are no _ideas_ of number in abstract, denoted by the
numeral names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they
are abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and
practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed
to have nothing at all for their object. Hence we may see how entirely the
science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling
it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation(724).
121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show of
discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical theorems
and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more fully
consider and expose the vanity of that pretence. And this will plainly
appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what
it was that originally put men on the study of that science, and to what
scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for
ease of memory and help of computation, made use of counters, or in
writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was made to
signify an unit, i.e. some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to
reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one
character stand in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the
notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use; wherein, by the
repetition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification
of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most
aptly expressed. Which seems to have been done in imitation of language,
so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures and
names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and
places in the former, corresponding to denominations in the latter. And
agreeably to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures,
were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the
parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or
_vice versa_. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or
analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and
so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any
particular things is said to be known, when we know the name or figures
(with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong
to them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of
arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by
them; and thus computing in signs, (because of the connexion established
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