The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
If at the same time we shall make the Mathematiques much more easie and
much more accurate, wt can be objected to us(51)?
We need not force our imagination to conceive such very small lines for
infinitesimals. They may every whit as well be imagin’d big as little,
since that the integer must be infinite.
Evident that wch has an infinite number of parts must be infinite.
We cannot imagine a line or space infinitely great—therefore absurd to
talk or make propositions about it.
We cannot imagine a line, space, &c., quovis lato majus. Since yt what we
imagine must be datum aliquod; a thing can’t be greater than itself.
If you call infinite that wch is greater than any assignable by another,
then I say, in that sense there may be an infinite square, sphere, or any
other figure, wch is absurd.
Qu. if extension be resoluble into points it does not consist of?
No reasoning about things whereof we have no ideas(52); therefore no
reasoning about infinitesimals.
No word to be used without an idea.
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(M9) If uneasiness be necessary to set the Will at work, Qu. how shall we
will in heaven?
Bayle’s, Malbranch’s, &c. arguments do not seem to prove against Space,
but onely against Bodies.
(M10) I agree in nothing wth the Cartesians as to ye existence of Bodies &
Qualities(53).
Aristotle as good a man as Euclid, but he was allowed to have been
mistaken.
Lines not proper for demonstration.
(M11) We see the house itself, the church itself; it being an idea and
nothing more. The house itself, the church itself, is an idea, i.e. an
object—immediate object—of thought(54).
Instead of injuring, our doctrine much benefits geometry.
(M12) Existence is percipi, or percipere, [or velle, i.e. agere(55)]. The
horse is in the stable, the books are in the study as before.
(M13) In physiques I have a vast view of things soluble hereby, but have
not leisure.
(M14) Hyps and such like unaccountable things confirm my doctrine.
Angle not well defined. See Pardies’ Geometry, by Harris, &c. This one
ground of trifling.
(M15) One idea not the cause of another—one power not the cause of
another. The cause of all natural things is onely God. Hence trifling to
enquire after second causes. This doctrine gives a most suitable idea of
the Divinity(56).
(M16) Absurd to study astronomy and other the like doctrines as
speculative sciences.
(M17) The absurd account of memory by the brain, &c. makes for me.
How was light created before man? Even so were Bodies created before
man(57).
(M18) Impossible anything besides that wch thinks and is thought on should
exist(58).
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That wch is visible cannot be made up of invisible things.
M.S. is that wherein there are not contain’d distinguishable sensible
parts. Now how can that wch hath not sensible parts be divided into
sensible parts? If you say it may be divided into insensible parts, I say
these are nothings.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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