The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or
excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c.
(M76) I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c.
than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. ’Tis certain that if the
happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine
must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative
good, discuss’d with French, Madden(93), &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of
mistake in judging of moral matters.
Mem. To observe (wn you talk of the division of ideas into simple and
complex) that there may be another cause of the undefinableness of certain
ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.
(M77) Mem. To begin the First Book(94) not with mention of sensation and
reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in
general.
(M78) I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or
an idea without perception.
(M79) Locke’s very supposition that matter & motion should exist before
thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.
Locke’s harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to
nothing, apply’d to the mathematicians.
They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wt mean
they by this? Wt would they signify by the word points? Do they stick to
the definition of Euclid?
(M80) We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or
sensible idea annex’d to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.
(M81) Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what
we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our
knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.
The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul(95).
(M82) Consciousness(96), perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all
one.
Consult, ransack yr understanding. Wt find you there besides several
perceptions or thoughts? Wt mean you by the word mind? You must mean
something that you perceive, or yt you do not perceive. A thing not
perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive
is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.
Mind is a congeries of perceptions(97). Take away perceptions and you take
away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.
Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I
answer, you are abused by the words “that a thing.” These are vague and
empty words with us.
(M83) The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may
have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth
perception.
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(M84) That wch extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is yt we think we see
an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third
Book(98).
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