There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish’d from natural; for tho’ the principles may be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence ’twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be established _jure Divino_ to demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us. (M85) Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white differ from white men.... I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction(99). In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, wch I say we have not nor can have. (M86) The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions? (M87) A good proof that Existence is nothing without or distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company(100). (M88) There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv’d. Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine. (M89) No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; each person’s time being measured to him by his own ideas. (M90) We are frequently puzzl’d and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin’d meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable. (M91) “A stone is a stone.” This a nonsensical proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever think on this: “The whole is equal to its parts,” &c. (M92) Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it. (M93) If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less. Wt means Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing. (M94) N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language(101). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M95) But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wn I come to treat more particularly of Existence. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐