Will not rightly distinguish’d from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence. (M96) Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery, viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wn nothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wn they have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present? (M97) ’Tis not to be imagin’d wt a marvellous emptiness & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations. (M98) Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with. (M99) Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming. (M100) The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles(102), strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind. (M101) I am persuaded, would men but examine wt they mean by the word existence, they wou’d agree with me. c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians. (M102) The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin’d barely to our own ideas(103). (M103) Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge. We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute. (M104) The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances(104). (M105) That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest argument against Locke’s proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv’d, put into action, without a previous uneasiness. (M106) The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition. (M107) Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason. (M108) Also from uneasiness and idea together. The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas. The Will not distinct from particular volitions. (M109) It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act. The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from ye will. This allow’d hereafter. (M110) To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the word _can_ presupposes volition. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M111) Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish(105).