I affirm ’tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea(111). Certainly we shall find that wt ever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known. ’Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M122) We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin’d; or infinitely greater(112) difference. (M123) We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wch is unknown. But I am embrangled(113) in words—’tis scarce possible it should be otherwise. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words(114). This has occasion’d ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M124) The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in truth ’tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. ’Tis _toto cælo_ different from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy(115) in the word _thing_, wn apply’d to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive(116). (M125) Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas(117). (M126) There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception? (M127) Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish’d therefrom. (M128) N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. ’Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—or _is_ time itself. Wt would the solitary man think of number? (M129) There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us(118). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐