(M130) Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to the mind(119). (M131) Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mind _exists not_—there is no time, no succession of ideas(120). (M132) To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M133) Folly to inquire wt determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will(121). (M134) Again, wt mean you by determine? (M135) (M136) For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc’d into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time. (M137) ’Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv’d, or before perception, that made men think perception(122) was somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. yt it was an idea of reflection; whereas the thing perceiv’d was an idea of sensation. I say, ’twas this made ’em think the understanding took it in, receiv’d it from without; wch could never be did not they think it existed without(123). (M138) Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination’s making. This is ye likeness of, and refer’d to the real idea, or (if you will) thing(124). (M139) To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble nothing but an idea. (M140) If you ask wt thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I say, ’tis no thing at all that wills(125). This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c. (M141) Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills. (M142) The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using the term “idea of(126),” is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so also in this. (M143) Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz. particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas. (M144) There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas, viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed by composition. (M145) I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any other intelligence; for that were a contradiction.