(M179) _Homo_ is not proved to be _vivens_ by means of any intermediate idea. I don’t fully agree wth Locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration & the use thereof; as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge. (M180) There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There may be volition without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the effects following the volition(143). (M181) We have assuredly an idea of substance. ’Twas absurd of Locke(144) to think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians. (M182) The substance of Body we know(145). The substance of Spirit we do not know—it not being knowable, it being a _purus actus_. (M183) Words have ruin’d and overrun all the sciences—law, physique, chymistry, astrology, &c. (M184) Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never think they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera & species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to them. (M185) Locke’s out(146)—the case is different. We can have an idea of body without motion, but not of soul without thought. (M186) God ought to be worship’d. This easily demonstrated when once we ascertain the signification of the words God, worship, ought. (M187) No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that which is altogether active & not at all passive, i.e. the Will. (M188) I can will the calling to mind something that is past, tho’ at the same time that wch I call to mind was not in my thoughts before that volition of mine, & consequently I could have had no uneasiness for the want of it. (M189) The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought two distinct beings. (M190) Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke, Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum. You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one with the m. v. [minimum visibile], because they be both minima, just perceiv’d, and next door to nothing. You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv’d. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality according as it is seen or felt. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M191) The spirit—the active thing—that wch is soul, & God—is the Will alone. The ideas are effects—impotent things. (M192) The concrete of the will & understanding I might call mind; not person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit defining of person, or making much mention of it. (M193) You ask, do these volitions make _one_ Will? Wt you ask is meerly about a word—unity being no more(147). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐