N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the Church or Churchmen. (M194) Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, and shew that they who blame them for jargon are not free of it themselves. Introd. Locke’s great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third book; at least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the 2d & 4th books don’t agree wth wt he says in ye 3d(148). (M195) If Matter(149) is once allow’d to exist, clippings of weeds and parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho’ he seems positive of the contrary. Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about things demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will be expected this Treatise will contain nothing but wt is certain & evident demonstration, & in truth I hope you will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take it all for such. Introd. (M196) When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I know not fully and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing meant thereby, this is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of matters of Reason and Philosophy—not Revelation. In this I think an humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot comprehend or understand the proposition), such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit, irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to pretend to dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about things that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When I shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall yield an explicit belief. Introd. Complexation of ideas twofold. Ys refers to colours being complex ideas. Considering length without breadth is considering any length, be the breadth wt it will. (M197) I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man—there being other intelligences to perceive them, before man was created(150). (M198) There is a philosopher(151) who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen’s sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance. (M199) N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐