‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M232) I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”(168) I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas. (M233) “Nihil dat quod non habet,” or, the effect is contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M234) Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, &c. (M235) Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea of God. ’Tis impossible(169). (M236) Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality(170). (M237) Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are usually confused. (M238) Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance. (M239) ’Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. This I do not understand. (M240) Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others. (M241) We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. ’Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party. (M242) Locke in his 4th Book(171), and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will. (M243) While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing. (M244) The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception(172). Volition or Will, Wch is not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book. (M245) There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;” “Gold is yellow;” “Gold is fixt;” “Gold is not a stone”—of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.