(M246) Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God(173). (M247) Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2d objection of Hobbs. (M248) Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object. (M249) Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of the scholastiques—“the will wills,” &c. So does Locke. I am of another mind(174). (M250) Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M251) Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs’s doctrine, &c. (M252) Malbranch in his illustration(175) differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this. (M253) I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind(176). All ye carefully and lucidly to be set forth. (M254) Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even wn not actually perceived; but still with relation to perception(177). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves(178). (M255) Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c. (M256) Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own making. (M257) The not distinguishing ’twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas(179). (M258) Say you, At this rate all’s nothing but idea—mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book(180). (M259) Idea is the object of thought. Yt I think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. ’Tis an act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the Will.