(M260) Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas. Ye idea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the “horse is white” I form a mental proposition with ease. But when I say “fortitude is a virtue” I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at. (M261) Pure intellect I understand not(181). Locke is in ye right in those things wherein he differs from ye Cartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas. (M262) The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction(182). (M263) I am certain there is a God, tho’ I do not perceive Him—have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wt is meant by certainty. (M264) It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible. (M265) Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition? (M266) Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this. (M267) Mem. To take notice of Locke’s woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things. (M268) Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that bodies do exist. Pray wt mean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know not wt(183). (M269) Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo. (M270) Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will? (M271) Understanding is in some sort an action. (M272) Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it has no likeness. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M273) Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M274) My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to the ground. (M275) Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the same(184). (M276) Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.