Succession explain’d by before, between, after, & numbering. Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure? Duration infinitely divisible, time not so. (M329) The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences. Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure. Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense. Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration. (M330) Time a sensation; therefore onely in ye mind. Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of ye soul easily conceiv’d, or rather the immortality of the person, that of ye soul not being necessary for ought we can see. Swiftness of ideas compar’d with yt of motions shews the wisdom of God. Wt if succession of ideas were swifter, wt if slower? (M331) Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances. Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind. (M332) In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c. Primary ideas prov’d not to exist in matter; after the same manner yt secondary ones are prov’d not to exist therein. Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wch is absurd. (M333) World wthout thought is _nec quid_, _nec quantum_, _nec quale_, &c. (M334) ’Tis wondrous to contemplate ye World empty’d of all intelligences. Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of ye existence of persons(198). Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo ye former also. Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1st sight? Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are different from those ideas perceived by touch wch goe by the same name. Diagonal incommensurable wth ye side. Quære how this can be in my doctrine? (M335) Qu. how to reconcile Newton’s 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine? Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginable _per se_. Molyneux’s blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight(199). Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt ’tis impossible it should exist without thought. (M336) Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know. No extension but surface perceivable by sight. (M337) Wn we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, ’tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations. (M338) Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction. Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?