(M339) In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times. (M340) If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c. Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend. The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of ye story of the German Count. Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to ye faculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul? (M341) Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wd then be apparently at rest? (M342) Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation? Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M343) The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as yt of a man(200). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:— 1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow yt unequals are equals, wch is absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch? 2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc. 3dly. From Molyneux’s problem, wch otherwise is falsely solv’d by Locke and him(201). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M344) Nothing but ideas perceivable(202). A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wch is not an idea is like or unlike an idea. Bodies &c. do exist even wn not perceived—they being powers in the active being(203). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says(204). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] encreated & diminish’d by parts. Hence taken for the same. If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both? Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.