Thereafter he addeth, _Quid sit fides, quid sit pietas, quid sit charitas, verbo Dei demonstratur. Quid ad hæc conducat, seu reputando rem in universum, seu reputando rem quatenus singulis competit, pendet ex cognitione circumstantiarum. Jam id definire Deus voluit esse penes ecclesiam, hae tamen lege, ut quod definit ecclesia, conveniat generali definitioni Dei._ The matter he illustrates with this one example: God’s word doth define in the general that we are to fast, and that publicly; but, in the particular, we could not have the definition of the word, because there are infinite occasions of a public fast, as it is said in the schools, _individua esse infinita_; so that it is the church’s part to look to the occasion, and this depends upon the consideration of the circumstances. This discourse of his cannot satisfy the attentive reader, but deserveth certain animadversions. _Sect_. 4. First, then, it is to be observed how he is drawn into a manifest contradiction; for whereas he saith, that God’s word doth _exserte_ and _diserte_ commend unto us _generatim_, such things as conduce to faith and manners, and that concerning things of this nature we have a general law in Scripture, how can this stand with that which he addeth, namely, that it is in the church’s power to define what things conduce to faith, piety, and charity, even _reputando rem in universum_? 2. Whereas he saith that the church hath no power to make laws, neither in things belonging to faith and manners, nor in things conducing to the same; I would also see how this agreeth with that other position, namely, that it is in the power of the church to define what things do conduce to faith, piety and charity. 3. What means he by his application of order to public, and decency to private actions, as if the Apostle did not require both these in the public words of God’s service performed in the church?