4. Whereas he saith that such things as conduce to faith and manners do depend upon the circumstances, and so could not be particularly defined in the word, either he speaks of those things as they are defined in the general, or as they are defined in the particular. Not the first; for as they are defined in the general, they cannot depend upon changeable circumstances, and that because, according to his own tenet, the word defines them in the general, and this definition of the word is most certain and constant, neither can any change happen unto it. Wherefore (without doubt) he must pronounce this of the definition of such things in the particular. Now, to say that things conducing to faith and manners, as they are particularly defined, do depend upon circumstances, is as much as to say that circumstances depend upon circumstances. For things conducing to faith and manners, which the church hath power to determine particularly, what are they other than circumstances? Surely he who taketh not Camero’s judgment to be, that the church hath power to determine somewhat more than the circumstances (and by consequence a part of the substance) of God’s worship, shall give no sense to his words. Yet, if one would take his meaning so, I see not how he can be saved from contradicting himself; forasmuch as he holdeth that such things as pertain to faith and manners are particularly defined in the word. To say no more, I smell such things in Camero’s opinion as can neither stand with reason nor with himself. 5. God’s word doth not only define things pertaining to faith and manners, but also things conducing to the same, and that not only generally, but in some respects, and sometimes, particularly. And we take for example his own instance of fasting. For the Scripture defineth very many occasions of fasting; Ezra viii. 21; 2 Chron. xx.; Jonah iii.; Joel ii.; Acts xiii. 3; Josh. vii. 6; Judg. xx. 16; Esth. iv. 16; Ezra ix. x.; Zech. vii. From which places we gather that the Scripture defineth fasting to be used, 1. For supplication, when we want some necessary or expedient good thing. 2. For deprecation, when we fear some evil. 3. For humiliation, when, by our sins, we have provoked God’s wrath. Neither can there be any occasion of fasting whereof I may not say that either it is particularly designed in Scripture, or else that it may be by necessary consequence defined out of Scripture; or, lastly, that it is of that sort of things which were not determinable by Scripture, because circumstances are infinite, as Camero hath told us. _Sect._ 5. Thus having failed by those rocks of offence, I direct my course straight to the dissecting of the true limits, within which the church’s power of enacting laws about things pertaining to the worship of God is bounded and confined, and which it may not overleap nor transgress. Three conditions I find necessarily requisite in such a thing as the church hath power to prescribe by her laws: