We have met for the purpose of saying a few words about the recent decision of the Supreme Court, in which that tribunal has held the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act to be unconstitutional; and so held in spite of the fact that for years the people of the North and South have, with singular unanimity, supposed the Act to be constitutional--supposed that it was upheld by the 13th and 14th Amendments,--and so supposed because they knew with certainty the intention of the framers of the amendments. They knew this intention, because they knew what the enemies of the amendments and the enemies of the Civil Rights Act claimed was the intention. And they also knew what the friends of the amendments and the law admitted the intention to be. The prejudices born of ignorance and of slavery had died or fallen asleep, and even the enemies of the amendments and the law had accepted the situation. But I shall speak of the decision as I feel, and in the same manner as I should speak even in the presence of the Court. You must remember that I am not attacking persons, but opinions--not motives, but reasons--not judges, but decisions. The Supreme Court has decided: 1. That the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, are unconstitutional, as applied to the States--not being authorized by the 13th and 14th Amendments. 2. That the 14th Amendment is prohibitory upon the States only, and the legislation forbidden to be adopted by Congress for enforcing it, is not "direct" legislation, but "corrective,"--such as may be necessary or proper for counteracting and restraining the effect of laws or acts passed or done by the several States. 3. That the 13th Amendment relates only to slavery and involuntary servitude, which it abolishes. 4. That the 13th Amendment establishes universal freedom in the United States. 5. That Congress may probably pass laws directly enforcing its provisions. 6. That such legislative power in Congress extends only to the subject of slavery, and its incidents. 7. That the denial of equal accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of public amusement, imposes no badge of slavery or involuntary servitude upon the party, but at most infringes rights which are protected from State aggression by the 14th Amendment. 8. The Court is uncertain whether the accommodations and privileges sought to be protected by the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act are or are not rights constitutionally demandable,--and if they are, in what form they are to be protected. 9. Neither does the Court decide whether the law, as it stands, is operative in the Territories and the District of Columbia. 10. Neither does the Court decide whether Congress, under the commercial power, may or may not pass a law securing to all persons equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between two or more States.